University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2000

Law and Regret (reviewing E. Allan Farnsworth, Changing Your
Mind: The Law of Regretted Decisions (1998))
Eric A. Posner

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Eric Posner, "Law and Regret (reviewing E. Allan Farnsworth, Changing Your Mind: The Law of Regretted
Decisions (1998))," 98 Michigan Law Review 1468 (2000).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

LAW AND REGRET
EricA. Posner*
CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETrED DECISIONS. By E.
Allan Farnsworth. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1998. Pp. xi,
271. $30.

Professor Farnsworth's' topic is what he calls the "law of regretted
decisions," those laws "that apply when you change your mind and reverse a decision" (p. ix). One finds such laws across many doctrinal
divisions. Contract law influences the decision to change one's mind
about keeping a promise. Tort law influences the decision to change
one's mind after starting to rescue another person. The law of wills
influences the decision to change one's mind about the distribution of
one's assets among heirs. Farnsworth believes there are general principles that underlie the law of regretted decisions. Although there are
some "anomalies," Farnsworth hopes to "further the rationalization of
legal concepts and the identification and eventual correction of their
deficiencies" (p. ix). The rationalization of legal concepts appears to
mean the identification of the common principles that underlie them
and the revision of the legal concepts that violate those principles.
What are these principles? Farnsworth identifies six: reliance, intention, dependence, public interest, anti-speculation, and repose. But
only the first two play an important role in Farnsworth's argument.
The dependence principle, which appears to refer to cases in which
conduct (rather than promising) puts others in a vulnerable position, is
summoned to explain why a person might be liable in tort for beginning but failing to complete a rescue, and why family law holds a stepfather liable for child support after divorce if he has cut off the child's
relationship with the natural father (pp. 93-96). The public interest
principle, which is apparently a principle of economizing judicial resources, is ushered in to explain a handful of rules of civil procedure
that discourage parties from changing their arguments
The antispeculation principle is hauled out to explain why certain "elections"
- by the victim of breach, to choose one remedy rather than another,
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago. B.A., M.A. 1988, Yale; J.D. 1991, Harvard.
- Ed. Thanks to Richard Craswell and Jack Goldsmith for very helpful comments, and to
the John M. Olin Fund, the Sarah Scaife Foundation Fund, and the Ameritech Fund in Law
and Economics, for generous financial support.
1. E. Allan Farnsworth is Alfred McCormack Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
2. Pp. 188-89; see also p. 131 for an application to contract remedies.
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or to terminate the contract, or by the victim of fraud to avoid the contract - are irreversible (p. 184). If they were not, the victim would in
effect have a valuable option, but "there is a pronounced judicial distaste for allowing one party to speculate at the other's risk" (p. 184).
And the repose principle is trotted out to explain why statutes of limitation bar claims even when there is no reliance on the claim holder's
inaction (p. 194). These arguments may be reasonable, but they are
peripheral, and unsurprising as well, so I will not focus on them.
The reliance principle has the starring role in Farnsworth's book,
with the intention principle playing a supporting part. The reliance
principle holds that the law should protect people who (reasonably?)
rely on the representations or actions of others. The intention principle holds that the law should protect people's intentions. Farnsworth's
grand claim appears to be - he is nowhere very specific - that the
law of regretted decisions can be explained using these two principles
(when the other four do not intervene). The law does not allow a person to change his mind (and, more important, act on that change of
mind) when doing so harms someone who has (reasonably?) relied on
the initial representation or action. When the reliance principle fails
to explain a law, the intention principle is called upon. The law does
not let a person change his mind when he did not intend to leave himself the opportunity to do so.
The argument runs into trouble quickly. Farnsworth correctly
points out that the reliance explanation is circular (p. 40). If the law
did not enforce promises, people would not rely on them - or at least
people would not rely on them being legally enforced. So reliance
cannot be the reason why the law enforces promises.
To understand this argument, observe initially that frequently the
law does not enforce promises on which people rely. For example, if
you break your promise to give me $100 as a gift, courts generally will
not award me a remedy even if, relying on your gift, I buy a $100 widget on credit. Or, if you break your promise to buy my house, but I
did not accept by making a return promise to sell my house and then
rely on your promise by firing my real estate agent, courts will not give
me a remedy. Or even if I did accept, but we never reduced the contract to writing, courts generally will not give me a remedy even if I
rely in some way. In all these cases, I rely on your promise, but would
not receive a remedy.
Even when the law enforces promises, it does not always provide a
remedy that compensates a person to the full extent of his reliance.
Consider a construction contract between an entrepreneur and a contractor that provides that the contractor will complete a new store on a
certain date. Making no allowance for delay, the entrepreneur orders
stock to be delivered on the day after the completion date. When the
contractor fails to finish on time, the entrepreneur claims as damages
the cost of providing additional transportation and storage for the
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stock? A court will not usually award such damages. Reliance is protected only when it is reasonable.
But the theory that the reliance principle protects reasonable reliance, rather than any reliance, is not useful without an account of what
is reasonable. To understand what reasonable reliance is, one needs a
separate theory about what counts as reasonable reliance and what
counts as unreasonable reliance.4 The claim that contract law reflects
the influence of a reliance principle, without more, does not provide
such a theory.
Farnsworth understands all this. Yet he says:
These objections ... ignore the certain outcry from those in the workaday world if the value of a promise had to be as deeply discounted as it
would if the law did not protect the resulting expectations or reliance.
The circularity argument overlooks the possibility that, regardless of legal consequences, a promise may arouse expectations or induce reliance
because the promisee supposes that the promisor will be encouraged to
perform by extralegal restraints. [p. 40]
The first point confuses the explanation and the thing that is to be
explained. Everyone agrees that the legal enforcement of promises is
sensible, but that does not settle the question of why legal enforcement of promises is sensible. That's what one needs a theory for, a
theory different from the reliance theory. The "workaday world"
would not object to learn that a theory other than the reliance principle explains why people can rely on promises; it would not care.
Farnsworth's second point needs further development to be convincing. If extralegal restraints are effective, why is it necessary for the law
to replace them? If they are not effective, why would people rely on
them?
The most plausible answer to the question of why promises are enforced, is that by enforcing promises, the law enables people to make
commitments that they would otherwise not be able to make, and
these commitments allow people to obtain good things in return (cash,
services, goods). If I cannot legally commit myself to repay loans with
interest, banks will not lend me money to buy a house. One does not
need to be a thoroughgoing Benthamite to recognize the value of laws
and institutions that enable people to accomplish goals that are important to them and enhance their well-being. Indeed, Farnsworth, who
3. See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract,and Property: The Model of Precaution,
73 CAL. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1985).

4. A discussion of this argument can be found in Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory
of Contract,86 CoLuM. L. REV. 269, 275 (1986). Farnsworth's argument is, as he acknowledges, derivative of Fuller and Perdue's argument. See generallyLon L. Fuller & William R.
Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in ContractDamages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936), and the

literature that it has spawned. As Richard Craswell shows in a recent article, the influence
of Fuller and Perdue's article has been unfortunate. See generally Richard Craswell, Against
Fuller and Perdue,67 U. CHI. L. REV. 99 (2000).
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does not seem to be a thoroughgoing Benthamite, agrees with this
welfarist explanation for the enforceability of promises (see Ch. 1 and
pp. 38, 42). But he does not attempt to reconcile the welfarist view
and the reliance view that he adopts; indeed, he does not even say
what he thinks is the relationship between these two explanations.
The circularity problem dissolves as soon as one sees that the
promisor and promisee have a joint interest in taking actions that
maximize the expected value of their contractual relationship. This
will usually involve (a) the promisor keeping his promise or paying
damages, and (b) the promisee engaging in an efficient amount of "reliance," or investment in anticipation of the promisor's performance.
Reasonable reliance is then understood as the amount of reliance that
maximizes the value of the promise. The law can encourage reasonable reliance by awarding damages upon breach of contract equal to
what the promisee would have gained if the promise had been performed and he had engaged in reasonable reliance, whether or not in
fact he did.5
Farnsworth might agree or disagree with this argument. If he disagrees with it, he should explain why, as it avoids the circularity problem and it has long been a part of the contracts literature. Instead,
Farnsworth moves on, and uses his reliance theory, despite its acknowledged defects, to explain various doctrines of contract law.
In Chapter Five, Farnsworth puzzles over the question of why
unrelied-upon promises are enforced, which seems to contradict the
reliance principle. He concludes that unrelied-upon promises are enforced because reliance (especially reliance consisting of the forgoing
of other opportunities) is difficult to prove (pp. 57-59). This response
is not so much wrong as it is unhelpful. Promises that take place
within markets are, in a sense, always relied upon. When a buyer
commits to buying from a seller, he detrimentally relies by giving up
the opportunity to buy from another seller. Promises that occur outside markets are not always relied upon, though they may be. The
beneficiary of a gratuitous promise may rely on a promise by shifting
his position, but he also may not. When he does, and when doing so
increases the value of the promise, there is an argument for enforcing
the promise. When he does not, the argument for enforcing the
promise is weaker.6 Difficulty of proof is always a consideration for
courts, and it is reflected in the use of presumptions, burden-shifting,
and other devices of civil procedure. But something more is needed to
explain patterns of contract doctrine.
5. See Jim Leitzel, Reliance and Contract Breach, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter

1989, at 87,91.
6. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the
Basis of Contract,89 YALE LJ.1261 (1980); Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Altruism andDeferred Gifts, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (1991).
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A similar point emerges from Farnsworth's discussion of why
courts award expectation damages given that (in his view) the reliance
principle explains contract enforcement. He argues that the expectation measure of damages is justified, because reliance includes lost opportunities, and "since lost opportunities are hard to prove, expectation is a surrogate measure for reliance."7 Again, lost opportunities
are not always hard to prove, and the difficulty of proof is dealt with
more easily by giving the promisee a presumption that reliance has occurred. If the reliance principle is so important, why not give the
promisor the chance to rebut the presumption by offering proof that
the promisee did not incur opportunity costs?
Farnsworth next argues that the expectation measure "produces
the apparently satisfying result of forcing the promisor to take into account the contract's value to the promisee when calculating the effects
of breach, thereby enhancing the promisor's incentives to perform and
encouraging people to deal with promisors" (p. 115). This is a reference to the so-called "efficient breach" theory. Farnsworth does not
explain why, if he thinks that reliance is the explanation for contract
enforcement, here he adopts an economic or welfarist view. Further,
he does not explain why we want to: (1) enhance the promisor's incentive to perform (and if so, why not award damages higher than expectation damages?); (2) encourage people to deal with promisors
(even when doing so is unwise?); and (3) ignore other incentives for
which the expectation measure is ill-suited, such as the promisee's incentive to take care.8
In the second half of his book, Farnsworth turns from commitments (or promises) to what he calls relinquishments and preclusions.
Relinquishments and preclusions occur when a person surrenders
something that he has to someone else (pp. 120-22). I will ignore the
small distinction that Farnsworth makes between them, and focus on
what happens when a person makes a transfer - either as a gift, or as
part of an exchange - and then changes his mind and seeks to reverse
this transfer.
Farnsworth asks the interesting question why the law treats transfers and promises differently. If I promise to give someone my car as a
gift, I generally can change my mind, retract the promise, and keep the
car without paying a penalty. But if I actually transfer title to the do7. P. 115. These claims are staples in the literature, as Farnsworth acknowledges. They
derive from Fuller and Perdue, see supra note 4, at 60, and are periodically resurrected, see
e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principleand Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741,
788-89 (1982).
8. Put more bluntly, Farnsworth wants to use the insights of law and economics, but he
does not take the trouble to provide an adequate account of the complexities that the literature has identified. For a recent survey, see Steven Shavell, Contracts, in THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 436, 436-45 (Peter Newman ed.,
1998).
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nee, I can't change my mind and get the car back. A similar, though
less stark, difference applies in the commercial context. If I breach my
promise to sell my car to you for $5000, I have to pay you damages. If,
however, I sell my car to you for $5000, and deliver it to you, I cannot
get the car back from you by forcing you to accept payment of the
damages that you would receive for breach of contract. Instead,
I must obtain your consent. In other words (although not in
Farnsworth's), both nongratuitous and gratuitous transferees are protected by a property rule; nongratuitous promisees are protected by a
liability rule; and gratuitous promisees are not protected at all (or, if
you want, the gratuitous promisor's interest in the promised goods is
protected by a property rule).'
This pattern is interesting, as other legal scholars have recognized,1" but what are we to make of it? Farnsworth argues that the
"intention principle" explains why transfers are not generally reversible. This will surprise the reader. If Farnsworth believes that the reliance principle, and not the intention principle, explains why promises
are enforced, why does he then appeal to the intention principle in order to explain why transfers are enforced? As Farnsworth's argument
is difficult to follow, I will take it step by step.
Farnsworth first observes that what counts as performance is defined by the parties' intent. In the case of the sale, the parties intend
that ownership pass from seller to buyer. By contrast, in the case of a
lease or bailment, the parties intend that the transferee will keep the
goods only for a certain period of time (pp. 129-31). It is unclear,
however, what Farnsworth makes of these examples. He appears to
think that they illustrate the relevance of the parties' intentions. But
in both cases, a certain right is passed from one person to another the right to keep the goods for all time, or the right to keep the goods
for a certain period of time - and in neither case can the transferor
change his mind and take the goods back (at all in the first case and
during the time period, in the second case). Intention explains the
right, but it does not explain the remedy, which is the subject of
Farnsworth's concern.
To see why this first step is not helpful, observe that Farnsworth
could have said the same thing about a promise. When a person
promises to make a sale, he promises to transfer title. When he
promises to lease an item, he promises to transfer possession for a certain period of time. So intentions control the nature of the property
right that will move from one person to another, but they do not explain why a liability rule protects the promisee but a property rule pro9. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).

10. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CH. L REV. 1
(1979); Andrew Kull, ReconsideringGratuitousPromises, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 39 (1992).
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tects the transferee. Indeed, when discussing promises, Farnsworth
thinks that the reliance principle, not the intention principle, explains
the remedy.
Farnsworth's next point is that parties can contractually arrange
for the seller to retain an interest in the goods after delivery, so that if
the buyer fails to come up with the money, the seller can recover the
goods rather than, or in addition to, damages (p. 130). In other words,
parties can contractually provide for remedies in certain cases, as well
as rights. Farnsworth adds for good measure that a seller may be able
to obtain possession -of the goods, even if he does not provide for such
a remedy in the contract, if he was unduly influenced by the buyer (pp.
130-31). Farnsworth thus concludes, with some additional complications that need not occupy us here, that the intention principle explains why sellers cannot repossess goods after delivery if the buyer
breaches.
It is not clear why Farnsworth thinks that these observations support his claim that the use of property rules to protect the transferee is
based on the intention principle. The law gives parties a great deal of
freedom to craft property interests, but it also gives parties freedom to
craft remedies in case of breach of contract. Yet Farnsworth believes
that remedies for breach of contract are based on the reliance principle. His mistake is in thinking that the law's respect for free choice
explains anything. The problem he seeks to solve is the law's treatment of regretted decisions exactly in those instances where the parties do not provide an answer by contract. When the parties do not
stipulate that the promisor can change his mind, and either not perform a promise or take back some item, the law must supply some default. We need a theory to explain why the law chooses particular defaults; the fact that the law allows people to depart from the defaults is
not relevant.
It should be clear by now where Farnsworth goes wrong. He confuses the question of who should get the entitlement with the question
of what is the proper remedy. If the intention principle and the reliance principle mean anything (and one should have doubts about
whether they do), they mean that a promisee should have the entitlement, and that the transferee should have the entitlement. That is
what both parties intend, and that is how both parties rely. But these
principles cannot answer the further question of whether the relevant
entitlement should be protected by a property rule or a liability rule
when the parties do not express an intention. When the parties do not
express an intention, either rule is consistent with their intentions and
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either rule can protect, in the loose sense used by Farnsworth, the entitlement holder's reliance.1 '
Farnsworth fares no better when he again invokes the intention
principle to explain the law's treatment of gratuitous transfers. He
makes two arguments. First, he argues that "a gift speaks to the present," whereas a promise speaks to the future, so "there is less reason
for a legal system given to paternalism to protect [the donor] from his
own improvidence" (p. 134). The implication is that some intentions
matter more than others, but how can we evaluate intentions without
having some theory that explains which intentions are pure and which
are corrupt? The reference to paternalism is not helpful. The law allows me to promise someone $100,000 in return for some internet
stocks that might have no value tomorrow; why would it not allow me
to promise to give away that much money?
Second, Farnsworth argues that "a gift is limited to what one has,"
so one is "powerless to squander [one's] future by means of a gift" (p.
134). Again, having invoked the intention principle to explain why
transfers are enforceable even though gratuitous promises are not,
Farnsworth bases his explanation on paternalism. The intention principle can make no sense of the different treatment of gratuitous
promises and gratuitous transfers. Both are intended, yet only gratuitous transfers are enforceable.
What, then, explains the patterns of law that we have been discussing? There is not space here to provide a complete theory, but a
few observations are in order. First, note that transferees receive
stronger protection than promisees. So the theory must show that a
person who possesses a good can more effectively invest in it than can
a person who merely expects to receive the good in the future. This is
plausible because a possessor is likely to have more information about
a good than a person who does not yet possess it. The good is in the
possessor's hands; he knows best how to store, maintain, and use it.
So even if the person who no longer has the entitlement - whether
transferor or promisor - does turn out to value the good more, the
transferor should not be able to violate the transferee's rights as freely
as the promisor should be able to violate the promisee's rights. The
location of possession distinguishes the two cases.
Second, note that recipients of gifts (including promises) receive
less protection than people who receive transfers or promises pursuant
to an ordinary exchange contract.12 This observation suggests that we
need a theory for why gifts are treated differently from commercial
11. Cf Richard Craswel, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy ofPromising,
88 MIcH. L. REv. 489 (1989) (arguing that available philosophical theories about promises

provide no basis for choosing among default rules).
12. See Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous

Promises,1997 Wis. L. Rav. 567,592-95 (1997).
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exchanges. Perhaps the social value of gifts is more ambiguous than
the social value of exchange - an old theme, about which there are
interesting arguments on both sides." Whatever the case, only such a
theory, not an appeal to principles of intention or reliance, can explain
the law's different treatment of gifts and exchanges. Intentions cannot
explain the law because the law regularly violates people's intentions
to give gifts. Reliance cannot explain the law because people's reliance depends on what the law is.

Farnsworth's book is framed by a quotation from Rousseau - "it
is absurd that the will should put itself in chains for the future" (p. 70)
- that does not mean what Farnsworth says it means. Farnsworth interprets this statement to mean that an individual would never rationally commit himself to performing some action. But Rousseau means
nothing of the sort. The passage from which Farnsworth appears to
have taken the quotation concerns the nature of the sovereign (the
"general will"), not the interests of an individual's will. 4 It is clear
from other passages in the book that Rousseau sees the obvious advantages
that accrue to individuals when they make binding commit5
ments.1
This does not detract from Farnsworth's substantive claims, but it
is symptomatic of the problem with his book. Farnsworth is a thorough and sophisticated scholar of contract doctrine - this is evident
from his superb treatise - but he does not fully take advantage of the
disciplines that might be used to understand that doctrine. Philosophy
and literature are mined for quotations but not for ideas. Economic
concepts are introduced but not explained or integrated with the argument. 6 Insights from sociology and psychology are ignored.
Farnsworth seems to think that doctrine itself can supply the principles that will explain it, but it cannot. The doctrine itself has inconsistencies, so narrow principles are falsified and principles broad enough
to encompass the contradictions have no critical edge.
Farnsworth's intermittent discussion of the case of Enricho
Navarroli illustrates these problems. 7 The state of Illinois had
charged Navarroli with drug dealing. The prosecutor promised
Navarroli that if he cooperated in the investigation, the prosecutor

13. See id. at 585-92.
14. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CoNTRACT 69-70 (Maurice Cranston
trans., 1968).
15. See id. at 60-61.
16. See supranote 8.
17. See People v. Navarroli, 521 N.E.2d 891 (Il1. 1988).
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would reduce the charges. Navarroli did cooperate, but the prosecutor broke his promise. When Navarroli objected, claiming breach of
contract, the trial court held in his favor, but the Supreme Court of
Illinois reversed the decision and held for the state. The court held
that Navarroli was not denied any of his constitutional rights because
he did not plead guilty in reliance on the prosecutor's promise.
Navarroli relied by cooperating in the identification of other criminals,
not by giving up constitutional rights. Farnsworth's criticism of the
court's holding can be quoted in full:
But even if [Navarroli] had no constitutional right, the reliance principle
surely justified the relief granted by the trial court. In finding it, with
Rousseau, "absurd that the will should put itself in chains for the future,"
and in allowing the state to change its mind to what Papinian would have
called Enricho's "disadvantage," the Supreme Court of Illinois disregarded this widely recognized general principle of contract law. [p. 203]
This argument is unconvincing. Navarroli relied on the prosecutor's promise, but we have seen that reliance is not always sufficient to
justify relief. Suppose that a detective told Navarroli soon after picking him up (and after Navarroli waived his constitutional rights) that
he would release Navarroli if Navarroli identified another suspect.
Navarroli, relying on this promise, identifies another suspect, but the
detective breaks his promise to release Navarroli. This kind of deceit
is common, and courts do not provide criminals with a remedy when
detectives engage in it. The suspect relies, but the reliance has no
normative import in the theories that we use to justify the criminal justice system.
It should be clear that sometimes reliance matters while other
times it does not matter. How do we decide whether reliance should
matter? If we think the police should not break promises made to
suspects in custody, then we should punish the detective in my hypothetical. If we think prosecutors should not break promises made to
criminal defendants, then we may object to the state's action in the
Navarroli case. But we need a theory for why we should think this.
That theory might balance a sense of fair play or respect for the
autonomy of citizens, on the one hand, and the exigencies of criminal
law enforcement, on the other hand, and where that balancing takes us
is by no means obvious. We might think that detectives should be able
to break promises but that prosecutors should not. The point, though,
is that we cannot resolve this question by appealing to the principle of
reliance.
One theory is that the prosecutor should take whatever actions
maximize the likelihood of successful criminal prosecutions, consistent
with constitutional protections. A defender of Navarroli could point
out that prosecutors will not be able to extract information from
criminal defendants if prosecutors cannot make enforceable promises
in return. If courts do not enforce agreements between prosecutors
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and defendants,
prosecutors will lose a valuable weapon for fighting
18
crime.
But there is a contrary argument. Prosecutors know that if they
violate agreements, defendants will not enter them; therefore, prosecutors have every incentive not to violate such agreements, at least if
they think that defendants learn about prior violations. Prosecutors
violate agreements only when the benefits (such as the capture of a
particularly vicious criminal) exceed the harm to the prospects of future cooperation with other defendants. Prosecutors are in the best
position to make this tradeoff, not courts; so courts should not enforce
agreements that prosecutors violate. True, rogue prosecutors might
violate some agreements in order to obtain short-term political gains,
and the institution would be better off if courts restrained such behavior. But courts are not well-suited for regulating the internal governance of prosecutor's offices, and supervision is perhaps best left to
higher political officials.
Much more can be said about these interesting issues. There are
philosophical questions about the proper treatment of regret; sociological questions about the internal organization of prosecutor's offices and the extent to which prosecutorial policy filters down to the
street; political and institutional questions about the relationship between courts and prosecutors; economic questions about the optimal
design of plea agreements; psychological questions about the ability of
criminal defendants to understand plea agreements and to make voluntary decisions in difficult circumstances. But these questions are invisible in the methodology on which Farnsworth relies. One cannot
answer hard questions about the design of criminal justice institutions
by appealing to abstract notions of reliance, notions that themselves
are wrenched from contexts as different as gift-giving among family
members and commercial exchange.

What leads Farnsworth down this path? Farnsworth sees himself
as describing the principles of contract law, and he appears to think of
principles in the following way. At the highest level, there are normative goals and ideals, including enhancement of well-being and perhaps various deontological constraints. At the lowest level, there are
the cases and doctrines themselves, like the consideration doctrine. In
between are the principles. These are generalizations about the doctrines and cases, but they are justified only to the extent that they

18. This argument was made by the dissent. The dissenting judge did not simply appeal
to the reliance principle; he argued that the majority's view would discourage plea agreements. See Navarroli,521 N.E.2d at 897-900 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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make sense in light of our normative ideals. The principles are intermediate between the normative ideals and the cases themselves.
The intermediary role of principles creates tensions, and this can
be seen at both the positive and normative levels at which the book
operates. Consider first the positive arguments. Farnsworth claims
that contract law obeys the reliance and intention principles, as well as
other principles. But he notes the many ways in which these principles
fail to explain certain doctrines. Farnsworth acknowledges that the
reliance principle cannot explain why gratuitous promises to charities
are enforceable. He accordingly appeals to the intention principle
here (pp. 78-79). But if the intention principle holds, why don't courts
enforce gratuitous promises made to non-charities? The answer appears to be, in Farnsworth's mind, that charitable gifts are socially
valuable and other sorts of gifts might be impulsive. But then the real
positive explanation of the cases is some combination of social values
- the desire to promote charitable giving, the desire to protect people
from their impulsiveness - and the intention principle plays no role.
Farnsworth could have skipped a step by arguing that courts do not
enforce gratuitous promises because they think that these promises often are made impulsively, unless the beneficiaries are charities, because the courts think that charities should be promoted. If this is the
explanation for the doctrine, it is unnecessary to appeal to intermediate principles like the intention and reliance principles.
A similar point can be made about Farnsworth's normative arguments. For example, he regrets that gratuitous promises that meet
some formality are not enforceable. If the enforcement of such
promises is desirable, but violates the reliance principle, then the mere
fact that the reliance principle can be derived from contract cases (if it
can) does not give it normative force. But if the reliance principle
does not have normative force, we cannot use it to praise or condemn
particular contract cases or doctrines. Yet Farnsworth does exactly
that when he criticizes the Navarroli court for violating the reliance
principle when refusing to enforce the plea agreement.
The problem with Farnsworth's methodology is that the content of
the principles depends on their justification. As noted before, no sensible intermediate principle would hold that all reliance should be protected. Rather, only reasonable reliance should be protected, but one
needs a theory to explain what reasonable reliance is. Similarly, no
sensible intermediate principle would say that all intentions should be
protected, and one needs a theory to distinguish intentions that should
be protected from those that should not be protected. The intermediate principles, then, do not have a critical edge unless one refers constantly to more general normative ideals, and that is what Farnsworth
does. The result is that the intermediate principles disappear as
sources of explanatory power, from both a normative and a positive
perspective.
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The intermediate principles could be understood in another way:
as descriptions of general patterns that appear in the doctrine. Various doctrines that might otherwise seem unrelated display interesting
consistencies. The consistencies can be described as principles; the
principles have no explanatory value, but need to be explained. To
explain them, we rely on economic, philosophical, or some other highlevel analysis.
There is nothing wrong with this style of scholarship as an a priori
matter, and it has a long and distinguished tradition. The problem is
that typically the search for principles takes over and becomes an end
in itself. All effort goes toward showing that cases are consistent (or
not) with each other, and the higher-level analysis comes through the
back door, usually to explain the occasional deviations, so the principles themselves, and most of the law, are left unexplained. This happens repeatedly in Farnsworth's book. A deviation from the intention
principle is described as "paternalism," but paternalism is a complex
idea, and raises more questions than it answers. What kind of paternalism? Is it justified? And so on. Farnsworth argues that people are,
or should be, released from certain commitments when the attractiveness of the commitment is the result of cognitive biases. But what are
these cognitive biases? Surely they do not justify releasing a person
from every commitment; but if not from every commitment, which
ones? Farnsworth says that expectation damages allow efficient
breach. But is breach always efficient? When is it efficient, and when
is it not?
Many scholars have abandoned the doctrinal approach taken by
Farnsworth because that approach takes for granted all of the difficult
questions. How would they write a book about the "law of regretted
decisions"? One can only speculate, but let me say a few words.
To the economist, regret is not a special or interesting concept.
When people make promises, or induce reliance through their conduct, it will sometimes be the case that the joint value of the promisor
and promisee's investment will be maximized if the promisor can
avoid keeping his promise, perhaps paying damages or perhaps not.
Optimal contract law will enforce promises to the extent that maximizes value. Whether or not the promisor regrets his promise is immaterial.
To the psychologist, regret is special. Some psychologists believe
that a person's fear of feeling regret will cause him to engage in behavior that is irrational under standard economic assumptions.
Whether it follows that the law or the courts have a role in regulating
this behavior is a difficult question. But the research project is clear:
to show ways in which the law recognizes this cognitive bias.19
19. See Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior,1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 43,62-73 (1999).
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To the philosopher, regret is also special. It raises the question of
why the "future self," the person who is bound to keep a promise,
should suffer as a consequence of the behavior of the "present self,"
the person who makes the promise.20 In some ways, the future self is a
different moral entity, so the benefit that the ability to make commitments confers on the present self does not necessarily justify the harm
to the future self - any more than the benefit that a government project confers on me justifies the harm that it imposes on you.
Farnsworth acknowledges this research but does not use it. That is
too bad. The research is often legally unsophisticated, simplifying the
law so much that it is almost unrecognizable. A synthetic approach to
the research by a legally sophisticated scholar like Farnsworth might
have produced a more distinctive contribution to contracts scholarship.

20. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984).

